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PAUL RICOEUR'S AESTHETICS:
TRADITION AND INNOVATION
There is asensation both 01 arrival and 01prospect, so
that one does indeed seem to 'recover a past and prejigure a
future', and thereby to complete the circle %ne's being. 1
In bis Poetics Aristotle argues that mimesis is a capacity, or a
potentiality, rooted in nature and realised by human nature as a
congenital property of humankind's natural mode of constructing and
inhabiting the universe. Thus understood mimesis is the origin of art as
imitation. This ancient view of the origin and nature of art has been
largely discredited in modern times. Yet Paul Ricoeur offers what I find
to be a bold rehabiliat~on of Aristotle's doctrine of mimesis, as weil as
a rereading of Imman':1el Kant. My contention is that Ricoeur aims to
restore meaning to ae~thetic tradition and, at the same time, to signify
something new in the :pregnant present vis-a-vis the immanent future.
I intend to elucidate .the tensions between tradition and innovation in
Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology.in order to un~over the precise
nature of his aesthetic$.
From the outset we might wonder about the cogency of
Ricoeur's aesthetics ~niting as it does contlicting Aristotelian and
post-Kantian traditions (including Hegel, possibly Schiller, Husserl and
Arendt). In fact Ricoeur's account of the origin and nature of the work
of art seems to exhibit an un-Aristotelian emphasis in that he introduces
a post-Kantian account of the human imagination. Ricoeur connects
nJimesis to a principle of the human cognitive project of reshaping reality
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modelIed on both Kant's category of productive imagination in the
Crititjue ofPure Reason and Kant's idea of reflective judgement in the
Critique 0/Judgement.
However, potentially more problematic for many contemporary
theorists is the fact that Ricoeur aims to restore meaning to the very
aesthetic discourse which has become the ~bject of modern and
postmodern critiques. I need only mention any one of the various,
equally radical, critiques posed by Marxists~ poststructuralists and
feminists of either Aristotelian metaphysics or Kantian aesthetics to
recognise the formidable challenges which inevitably face Ricoeur's
appropriation of these traditions. In order to address these potentially
destructive criticisms I will reconstruct Ricoeur's aesthetics, taking into
account his most recent work in Time and Na"dtive, 1-111 and Soi-meme
comme un autre.
To begin I need a frame of reference. I~ is possible to recognise
various aesthetic theories whieh have, in t~e course of Western
intellectual history, constituted different accounts of what it is that all
works of art share which gives them their valöe. In reeent discussions
four elements have been distinguished as rele~ant for assessing a work
of art: the work, the artist, the universe and the audience. Using these
elements four main types of theories may be proposed. First, the mimetic
theory is based upon the relation of the work of art to the universe;
second, the expressive theory is based upon the relation of the work to
the artist; third, the pragmatie theory is eoneerned with the relation of
the work to the audience; fourth, the objective theory is coneerned solely
with the relation of the work to itself as a purely autonomous object.
Consistent with my opening statement the mimetic theory
explains art as essentially an imitation of aspects of the universe. This is
probably the most primitive aesthetic theory. Yet the mimetic as weil as
the expressive approaches to art have been intellectually delegitimated .
by certain contemporary theorists. The deconstructionists insist that all
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there is is the autonomous work, i.e., the text imitates nothing outside
itself; other postmodernists exhibit an overriding pragmatic concern with
the affect upon the audience. Notwithstarlding these views a combination
of a11 four theories informs Ricoeur's account of aesthetic value.
We can see this combination of elements by considering,
however schematically, Ricoeur's account of mimesis 1·3. Mimesisl as
the prefiguration of human action encompasses elements of bpth the
mimetic and the expressive theories of aesthetics. It involves the
structural, symbolic and temporal resources which make possible the
poetic composition of a work. For instance the semantics of action,
norms of society and circumstances of history would all be constitutive
elements of prefiguration.2 Mimesis2 as the configuration of experience
would seem to incorporate mimetic theory and objective theory,
especially the Aristotelian and the Kantian conceptions of the work of
art. The work imitates human. reality in such a manner to Iiberate the
reader/audience; the wo'rle exhibits objective/formal qualities which make
possible the judgement of its beauty as communicatirig an universal
delight.3 Mimesis3 as tlte refiguration of human praxis brings together
the mimetic and the pr~gmatic theories. Narrative refiguration, whether
historicalor fictionat, aims to mediate the world of the text and the
world of the reader.4 ~oncerning the poetics of refiguration Ricoeur
claims that .
A new element enriching poetics arises here out of an
taesthetics'...if we restore to the term taesthetic' the fuIl range of .
meaning of the Greek word aisthesis and if we grant to it the task
of exploring the ~uItiple ways in which a work, in acting on a
reader, affects thCJt. reader. This being-affected has the noteworthy
quality of combining in an experience of a particular type pa&~;ivity
and activity..5
From Ricoeur's account of the prefiguration, configuration and
refiguration of experience I would conclude that mimesis is a function
of human beings who, as dual-aspect beings, must mediate passivity and
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activity. sensibility and understanding. finitude and infinitude. transience
and .permanence. Following Aristotle mimesis is a natural mode of
constructing and inhabiting the world; yet in more modern terms the
threefold mimesis also aims to mediate time. i.e. bistorical experience
and eternity. i.e. transsignifying possibilities.6
To give the modern background to ~lcoeur's aesthetics. I will
acknowledge bis major debt to Kant who ofters the first intellectual
definition of aesthetics as an autonomous field Qf pbilosophy. Admittedly
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-62) and bis Aesthetica (1750-58)
immediately predate Kant (1724-1801) and Jijs Critique 0/ Judgement
(1790). Writing prior to Kant Baumgarten defines aesthetics in terms of
the appreh~nsion of sense phenomena; and he introduces concepts for
evaluation of beauty as phenomenal perfection. However, Kant
formulates the characteristically modern defi~tion of aesthetics as an
autonomous dimension uniting two different aspects of conscious
experience. Kant argues that the unifying act isperformed by the faculty
of judgement, 'which in the order of our cognitive faculties forms a
middle term between understanding and re~on'; such judgement is
governed by independent and apriori principles'·which constitute aesthet-
ics as a special dimension.? ;
Let us further recall Kant's position. After the first two critiques,
in which Kant reveals the apriori foundations of knowledge and
morality, respectively, there remains a task of not only unifying the
critical project through a study of judgement, but also of demonstrating
the legitimacy of judgements of taste, and in particular the type of
reflective judgement characteristic of aesthetics. Kant ofters an analytic
and a ~eduction that demonstrates the apriori ground of trus distinctive
type of judgement. Aesthetic judgements are not to be confused or
identified with knowledge of the phenomenal world nor with the activity
of pure practical reason. But this does not imply that such judgements
are merely idiosyncratic. They make adefinite clainl to universality or,
as Ricoeur stresses, communicability:
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a central theme in Kantian aesthetics [is] that communicability
constitutes an intrinsie component of the judgement of taste.·
And yet Kant stresses that "the judgement of taste... is not a
cognitive judgement, and so not logical, but is aesthetic • which means
that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than
subjective...9 Throughout Kant maintains a basic dichotomy between the
subjective and the objective, although he transforrns the meaning of
these terms.
Now Ricoeur's post-Kantian contention is that the narrative
operation of mimesis2 has the character of a judgement, more precisely,
of a reflective judgement in Kant's sense of the term. That is narrative
configurations function to unify a temporal succession. In Ricoeur's
words,
the art of narrating is reflected... in the attempt to' grasp together'
successive events. The art of narrating, as weil as the
corresponding art of following a story, therefore require that we are
able to extract a configuration from a succession (yet] ...the primary
concern is with the worlds ...authors and texts open Up.IO
So conceived Ricoeur's restoration of aesthetic discourse gives
value to both the temporal succession - found in Kant's account of
human experience - and the dramatic unity - found in Aristotle's account
of emplotment.11 These two accounts are reflected in the configurational
acts which incorporate, as a product of time, the story of a community.12
Moreover Ricoeur's hermeneutics of restoration endeavours to disclose
the social implications of narrative configurations. Still we might question
this position. One fundamental problem is that Ricoeur's configurational
act aims to marry an historical account of Aristotelian mimesis - with the
implicit relativism of an apparently archaie metaphysics - and the special
cognitive values assigned to his post-Kantian rereading of nlinzesis.
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To answer this question I would place Ricoeur's aesthetics in the
context of a post.He~elian Kantian tradition • this is consistent with his
own self-description. 3 In particular there are striking similarities between
Ricoeur's aesthetics and the account which Jürgen Habermas gives of
Schiller's relation to Kant and Hegel in The Philosophical Discourse 0/
Modemity. Habermas maintains,
Kant's Critiqw o/Judgement... provided an entry for a speculative
Idealism that could not rest content with. the Kantian
difCerentiations between undc istanding and sense, freedom and
necessity, mind and nature, beeaose it perceived in preeisely these
distinctions the expression of dichotomies inherent in modem
Jife-conditions. Bur the mediating JXWICr of reOeetive jUdgement
served ScheUing and Hegel as the bridge to an intelleetual intuition
that was to assure itself of absolute identity. Schiller was more
modest. He held on to the restrieted significance of aesthetic
judgement in order to make ose of it for a philosophy of history. He
thercby tacitly mixed thc Kantian with thc traditional concept of
judgcment, whieh in the Aristotclian tradition (down to Hannah
AreDi'\ :',,'.vcr completely lost its connection with thc politieal
con~ i i ' .", (..ommon sensc. So he could eonecivc of art as primarily
a form of communieation and assign to it thc task of bringing about
Iharmony in socicty,.14
A point similar to that made of Schiller could be made of Ricoeur: he
mixes the Kantian concept of judgement with the Aristotelian as it
comes down to Hannah Ar~ndt. In his preface to Arendt's Condition de
/'homme modeme Ricoeur recognises the value of her conception of
history, action and mimesis. Arendt wants to retain the, Greek account
of mimesis as a creative imitation of action in its political dimension;
Ricoeur extends this mimesis to narrative configuration modelIed upon
Kant's idea of aesthetic judgement. Furthermore Ricoeur, following
Arendt, wants to resist a modern tendency to replace a concrete political
conception of mimesis with a speculative - Hegelian - conception of
history.15
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Granted Ricoeur's rehabiliation of Aristotle with its
post-Kantian dimensions involves complex matters. Not the least of
these matters are the difficulties which attend subject-orientated theories
including, crucially, what guarantees the security and the authority of the
cognitive categories of the knowing (Kantian) subjecl. Ricoeur bimself
wrestles with this question of the subject in terms of narrative identity.16
An alternative reading of Ricoeur is through Husserl's later
phenomenology, that is, through locating the knowing subject in the
intersubjective relations of the social world. Here cognition, and hence
mimesis, have their roots in what is humanly and socially shared; there
is no symbolic creation which is not in the final analysis rooted in the
common symbolical ground of humanity. And Ricoeur clearly owes a
debt to the phenomenological tradition for elucidating the meaning of
the Iived experiences of time. We will see that Ricoeur gives a further
function to the imagination: in phenomenological terms imaginative
variations make possible the opening up of actual and possible worlds.
For me a reading of Ricoeur sensitive to his continuing debt to
Husserl as weil as to Kant - besides Aristotle - also makes sense of his
original project in F~eedom and' Nature. Ricoeur's projeet for a
philosophy of the will presupposes both Kant's conception of natural
causality as a necessary objective order of temporal succession and
Husserl's subjective analysis of internal-time consciousness. For instance,
Time is the form according to which the present changes
constantly as to its content... it is the order of succession of
moments... should we say that the marks of subjectivity attach only
to acts bound by the succession? [instead] succession represents
the fundamental bipolarity of human existence... it is undergone and
carried on}7
The above retleets Kantian and Husserlian presuppositions
concerning the rational subject's relation to time. These presuppositions
equally characterise the aporia of Tinte and Na"ative, III. It follows from
213
Ricoeur's account of a' dual-aspect being that mimesis is a necessary
function for mediation of freedom and necessity.
In order to see the development of this account of temporal
experience for aesthetics let us turn to Soi-meme comme un autre. By
confronting the problem of self j-:, t dty Ricoeur is able to recognise
further aspects of human freedom aud natural necessity. For one thing,
he places narrative activity in a position comparable to the fragile
mediation between the extremes of infinitude and finitude which is
described in Fallible Man. The significant contribution of Soi-meme to
contemporary debates about personal identity is in drawing a
post-Kantian distinction between being the same (idem) and being the
seil-same (ipse). On this basis Ricoeur introduces narrative identity as a
function of ipseite into the temporal milieu between permanence and
change.l8
For another thing, Ricoeur develops the Husserlian art of
imaginative variation. He uses this art in order to demonstrate the ways
in which mimesis offers the possibility of articulating the relationship
between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation.
Narrative identity oscillates between the two extremes of possibility and
actuality, of world of text and world of audience.19
An objection to the coherence of my reading needs to be
addressed. If compared with other reconstructions of Kant's contribution
to contemporary aesthetic theory, Ricoeur's refusal to accept an aesthetic
which depends upon a subjective account of individual genesis or taste
may be thought to be contradictory. Notably Ricoeur conceives the
aesthetic value of myth as the communal work of constructing an
intelligible world, as a symbolic creation which is in the final analysis
rooted in the common symbolic ground of humanity and as the symbolic
exploration of our relationship to beings and to Being.20 This
conception is not able to be reconc:iled with aesthetic judgement defined
- after Kant - as being subjective, disinterested, unconnected with desire,
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exclusive and serving no immediate practieal purpose. In faet Rieoeur
brings into question this definition by elueidating the aesthetie value of
myth in representing the mediation of tradition and innovation.
Generally speaking philosophers since Kant have been presented
with a ehoice of possible paths. On the one hand, analytical philosophers
may choose to support aesthetics as an autonomous discourse by
declaring it out of bounds so far as politics, eulture and theory are
concerned. In this ease one would make the obvious appeal to aesthetic
disinterest, to what Kant expressly states about the character of art,
rather 'than what the whole strueture of Kant's philosophy constrains him
to imply. But a elose and consequent critique of, for instance, aesthetics
in the analytical. tradition would no doubt show how real and pressing
are the ideological interests that conceal themselves behind such talk of
principled autonomy. To name a few ideologieal interests: there are
questions of gender, race, ethnicity and class.
On the other hand philosophers • especially those so-called
Continental - may take up the Kantian challenge, accepting the need for
some articulated theory of aesthetics, politics and knowledge, though
conscious of the difficulties that stand in the way of such a project. This
project must inevitably: lead beyond aesthetics as such to a critical
accounting of interests and truth-claims which would undermine its role
as an autonomous discdurse.
I would insist that the originality of Ricoeur rests in his attempt
to seek a mediating position between these two extremes. It is important
to restate the problem which Ricoeur helps us to recognise in Kant's
analysis of aesthetic judgement. Kant's problem is to explain how
aesthetic judgement is related to a distinctive type of subjective aesthetic
pleasure - distinct from other sorts of pleasure - and at the same time
to account for the communal validity of such judgements. Kant states
that the cognitive powers are in 'free play, since no definite concept
restricts them to a particular rule of cognition... This state of[ree play of
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the cognitive faculties attending a representation by which an object is
given must admit of universal communication.'21 In other words Kant
aims to demonstrate that aesthetic judgements are grounded in human
subjectivity and yet are not merely relative to an individual subject. Taste
is communal. not idiosyncratic.
I believe that a reading of Ricoeur forces us to confront the
inconclusive conclusion of Kant's Critique of Judgement. This
confrontation might be reduced to two questions: .does the universality
of taste, once it is produced, turn out to be a natural and original
property ot the human subject? or does the subject to which a
universality of taste can appropriately be attributed turn out to be the
product of a process of cultural and historical unification? And Ricoeur
would seem • unwittingly or not • to have a response to these questions:
he creatively preserves the tensions inherent in post-Kantian aesthetics.
On the one hand. with bis discussions of prefiguration Ricoeur
must admit the dependency of artistic practices on historically variable
social relations conditioning both the production of works of art and the
manner in which they are socially circulated and received. On the other
hand. as seen above the real work lies in elucidating those aspects of a
narrative configuration which liberates the author/reader and makes
possible the formal qualities of the configurating act as a retlective
judgement. The most that the analysis of the social relations conditioning
artistic practices might .accomplish is to account tor the varying ways in
which tradition is mediated and so ceaselessly refigured. Thus we can see
in answer to criticism mentioned at the outset of this paper that
We must challenge with equal force the thesis of a narrow
structuralism which forbids Cmoving outside of the text' and that of
a dogmatic Marxism which merely shifts onto the social plane the
worn-out topos of imitatio naturae. It is on the level of a public's
horizon of expectationsthat a work exercises... the Ccreative
funclion of the work of art'... Ir a new work is able to create an
aesthetic distance. it is because a prior distance exists between the
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whole of Iiterary Iife and everyday practice. It is a basic
characteristic of the horizon of expectation of an even more basic
noncoincidence, namely, the opposition in a given culture 'between
poetic language and practical language, imaginary world and social
reality'... What we have just indicated as Iiterature's function of
social creation ariscs quite precisely at this point of articulation
between the expectations turned toward art and literature and the
expectations constitutive of everyday experience.22
The above also refleets Rieoeur's appropriation of effeetive
history (Wirkungsgeschichte). This implies that insofar as we appropriate
past experiences with an orientation to the future, the authentie present
is preselVed as the locus of continuing tradition and of innovation; the
one is not possible without the other. Both past and future, tradition
and innovation, merge into the objectivity proper to a context of
effective history. Of course as Ricoeur bimself reeognises there arp
different ways of reading effective history aeeording to continuity and
discontinuity. In particular Ricoeur differs from Michel Foucault on the
question of discontinuity.23
The problem remaining for Ricoeur in the light of certain
postmodern theorists is to maintain a meta-aesthetic discourse. Here his
answer to the postmodern critic must be" in maintaining a productive
relation between text and history, freedom and constraint, vision and
debt. In his words,
Free from the external constraint of documentary proof, fiction is
bound internally by the very thing that it projects outside itself.
Free from... artistS must still make themselves free for... If 'this were
not the case, how could we explain the anguish and sufCering of
artistic creation as they are attested to by the correspondence and
diaries of a van Gogh or a C~zanne? ...the stringent law of
creation, which is to render as perfectly as possible the vision of
the world that inspires the artist, corresponds feature by feature to
the debt of the historian and of the reader of history wilh respect
to the dead... The freedom of the imaginative variations is
communicated only by being cloaked in the constraining power oe
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aVISIon of the world. Thc dialectic between freedom and
constraint. intel ~i.!l 10 thc crcative process. is thus transmitted
throughout the hermeneutical process.34
Frnm this I eonelude that Ricoeur's discourse on aesthetics culminates
in a creativelhermeneutical process. This would be consistent witb, for
instance, a claim of the }Juetess Veroniea Forrest-Thomson:
if poetry is to justify itself ... it must articulate the already-known
and subject it to a reworking which suspends aod questions i15
categories. provides allernative orderings.25
In dialectically relating tradition and innovation Ricoeur ofters an
aesthetics wbich constitutes and is constituted by the possibility of a
poetic refiguration. As we have seen Ricoeur's position is not merely to
re-assert an Aristotelian or a post-Kantian aesthetics; yet bis constant
aim is to restore meaning to both these traditions. Such restoration does
nil' ~nstitute a facile project. Instead it encourages an active
engagement with various critiques of aesthetic tradition, including
Marxist, structuralist and postmodernist critiques. This engagement is
productive insofar as Ricoeur's threefold mimesis of prefiguration, conti-
guration and refiguration retlects an endeavour to rework accepted
categories in order to signify something new in the pregnant present
vis-a-vis the immanent future.
Thus I see in Ricoeur's aesthetics t~,
vision of arrival and of prospect:
.,ntial for that poetic
to 'recover a past and prefigure a future: and thereby to complete
the circle of one's being.
Roanoke College
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